International Nuclear Cyber Security Threat Landscape by Eggers, Shannon & Nickerson, Charles
International Nuclear Cyber Security Threat Landscape 
 
Shannon Eggers and Charles Nickerson 
 
Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, MS 3675, Idaho Falls, ID 83415, USA, shannon.eggers@inl.gov 
 
 
Abstract: The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Nuclear Cyber Team (NCT) is a recognized leader in 
international nuclear cyber program assessments as well as nuclear cyber training development and 
delivery. This paper discusses how the NCT is implementing their vision to protect global nuclear 
infrastructure from cyber threats. Also outlined is the team’s perspectives on the global nuclear cyber threat 
landscape and the top ten approachable cyber security measures that can be applied to immediately 





The Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) is “dedicated to the safe, secure, and 
effective stewardship of nuclear materials and related technologies through the advancement of scientific 
knowledge, technical skills, policy dialogue, professional capabilities, and best practices.” INMM is 
comprised of six divisions: (1) Facility Operations, (2) International Safeguards, (3) Materials Control & 
Accountability, (4) Nonproliferation & Arms Control, (5) Nuclear Security & Physical Protection, and (6) 
Packaging, Transportation & Disposition. While nonproliferation is a separate division, it is really an 
element of each division. The same argument is valid for cyber security – cyber security is typically grouped 
under the nuclear security division but is really an integral component across the entire INMM mission. 
INMM’s nonproliferation and cyber security purpose both have the same end goal to promote the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy and nuclear material.  
 
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is the Department of Energy’s lead laboratory for nuclear energy. 
Within INL is the National and Homeland Security (N&HS) directorate which has a mission to develop 
critical national and homeland security capabilities. Furthermore, as part of N&HS, the Nuclear Cyber Team 
(NCT) works domestically and internationally to provide solutions, training, and research to enhance 
international nuclear security. In the United States, the nuclear sector is the most regulated critical 
infrastructure. In addition, cyber security at nuclear power plants has been regulated since 2009 [1]. 
Internationally, however, the nuclear cyber security program in many countries is still in its infancy.  
 
The NCT has expertise in control systems specific to nuclear facilities, physical protection systems, 
cyber standards and regulations, cyber assessments for critical infrastructure, threat analysis, and training 
development and delivery. The vision of NCT is to “protect global nuclear infrastructure from cyber 
threats.” This vision is achieved through R&D, domestic and international training programs, university 
collaboration, and industry outreach. Training programs have been developed and delivered both 
domestically and internationally on topics such as Technical Introduction to Cyber Security for Nuclear and 
Radiological Facilitates, Managing Cyber Risks for Nuclear and Radiological Facilities; and for the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Training Courses on Computer Security at Nuclear 
Facilities, Conducting Computer Security Assessment at Nuclear Facilities, Threat and Consequence 




INTERNATIONAL CYBER THREAT LANDSCAPE 
 
In contrast to United States regulations, individual national level regulations throughout the 
remainder of the world remain weak and/or unenforceable. In addition, implementation measures at sites 
is inconsistent and vulnerable while at the same time the dependencies on digital devices are drastically 
increasing. In fact, there is typically a huge disconnect between the level of security actually implemented 
compared to the initial security design and the security expectations (Figure 1). 
 
 
  Figure 1. The dichotomy of cyber security implementation. 
 
The continuous evolution of cyber warfare tactics has led to a cyber arms race. As an adversary’s 
cyber threat maturity evolves, their proficiency in distorting, disrupting, destructing, disclosing, and 
discovering also improves. Consequently, as a threat actor’s sophistication in tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) increases, defensive and protection capabilities must also keep pace, especially as digital 
components are added in all areas of the fuel cycle. Ideally, the protection capability to detect, delay, and 
respond surpasses, or at least keeps pace, with an adversary’s cyber attack expertise. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the cyber attack surface is constantly evolving along 
with attack sophistication. Modernization and digitization improves efficiencies and reliability, but also 
increases cyber vulnerabilities. Cyber attack vectors also differ depending on the fuel cycle stage – the 
cyber attack vector for theft and diversion of nuclear material from a storage facility is much different than 
the cyber attack vector during transportation. It is a goal of the NCT to assist the global community in 
strengthening their cyber security posture through creation of effective rule-making, regulatory guidance, 
implementation documentation, and defense-in-depth strategies.  
 
TOP 10 SECURITY CONTROLS 
 
 Defense-in-depth is the application of multiple security controls to reduce the attack surface of an 
asset or digital system. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publication 800.53 
revision 4 provides a catalog of security controls for use in information systems [2]. Based on this listing, the 
top ten most approachable controls for a cyber awareness campaign are provided in Table 1. The intent of 
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using these controls is to immediately improve a facility’s security posture by reducing the number of 




 The nuclear cyber security threat landscape is constantly changing and becoming more 
sophisticated. When combined with the fact that global regulations for nuclear cyber security systems are 
often weak or unenforceable and that these implementations do not systematically address cyber risks, the 
question becomes not if there will be a nuclear cyber attack, but when. It is imperative that international 
outreach continues through collaborations and training programs to increase the cyber security awareness 




[1] 10 CFR 73.54, Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and 
Networks. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March, 2009. 
 
[2] Special Publication 800-53, revision 4. Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and 




Table 1. Top 10 approachable security controls. 
Control Action 
1 Establish and document a Cyber Security Plan that is integrated with Site Security Plan  
Cyber security plans establish objectives and requirements for cyber security controls. These plans also document 
and reference any federal, state, local, and company specific regulations, policies, rules, and procedures to ensure 
compliance while maintaining focus on security goals. Other key information contained within the plan could 
include network architecture, data flow rulesets, privileges, as well as roles and responsibilities for normal and 
emergency situations. Many of the activities defined below will help derive organizational policies contained 
within the plan.  
2 Conduct and document an inventory of digital assets 
A fundamental rule in cyber security is to understand what devices are operating on the system. A device 
inventory can be used to detect unauthorized devices. Key controls for inventorying a system include:  
- Define authorized components within each network zone and/or level (if applicable);  
- Passively and dynamically track devices and understand how/why they function on the network; and  
- Define authorized personnel to configure and maintain devices.  
3 Conduct and document an inventory of software  
Organizations should actively manage (inventory, track, control, document, etc.) all software running on their 
systems so that only approved and trusted applications can execute and communicate. Understanding which 
versions of the software running is critically important; this information can feed patch management efforts and 
help identify other security gaps. Unauthorized software should be identified and deleted. Limit personnel with 
administrative rights and those that can install software onto the system.  
4 Identify and document secure configurations  
Secure configuration development can divided into two distinct efforts:  
1. Establish a secure baseline configuration  
2. Maintain approved configurations  
Manufacturers, vendors, and governmental agencies publish guides and recommendations for hardening the 
various executables, privileges, and operations performed by hardware and software.  
5 Conduct vulnerability scans, risk assessments and manage risk  
Cyber threat actors seek to detect and exploit coding, configuration, and/or other deployment vulnerabilities of a 
system. It is recommended that automated vulnerability scanning tools run on all network systems at regular 
intervals using Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) validated tools. See NIST’s website for recommended 
SCAP products. Vulnerabilities should be measured against overall system risk and then assigned a risk mitigation.  
6 Minimize and control access to devices and other system interfaces  
Access to digital devices should use “Least Privileged Access” policies in order to minimize the quantity and type of 
personnel with legitimate access. Organizations should use complementary administrative, physical, and technical 
controls to not only govern access but also monitor activities once access has been achieved. Minimize access 
“carve-outs” or exceptions that bypass these controls. Identify digital dependencies of security system devices.  
7 Set up network boundary defenses  
Use technical controls such as firewalls to inspect all inbound traffic. Application firewalls should be deployed and 
configured for non-Web-based applications such as configuration management applications. Firewalls should also 
be configured to analyze data flows and directional changes as well as detect and control abnormal bandwidth 
consumption.  
8 Set up malware defenses  
Multiple automated tools have been developed to continuously monitor workstations, servers, devices, etc. for 
the presence of malware on systems. Key malware defenses ensure that digital devices will not automatically run 
content from unauthorized drives. Administrative controls should be established so that outside devices (such as 
USB drives and vendor laptops) can be scanned before users access the network.  
9 Establish and document an incident response plan  
Cyber-attacks will occur. Planning for an attack and developing a response and continuity of operations plan will 
help limit the impact/downtime. Key to this planning is identifying the personnel (or roles and responsibilities) 
involved should an attack occur. Backing up system data and system configurations is also key to rapid restoration 
after an attack. Store backups in a secure location.  
10 Train security personnel on cyber security  
Threat actors often seek to exploit gaps in cyber security that exist between what an application is designed to do 
and how personnel actually use the application. It is recommended that regular cyber security awareness training 
be provided to security personnel. Additionally, it is crucial for cyber security personnel (especially incident 
response members) to understand how the security functions and how it is configured. Training both parties is 
fundamental.  
 
